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The Effect of Removing Accident Repeaters From the Road
In newspaper editorials, public commentaries and the like, licensing
authorities are often advised to solve the "accident problem" by taking the
"nut behind the wheel" off the road. This paper uses six-year driver
records of some 8, 000 California drivers to estimate the reduction in
accidents that would in fact occur if accident repeaters were removed from
the road.*
1. 1 Introduction
Popular notions concerning the role of chance and causal factors in
automobile crashes suggest the existence of a basic attitude towards acci-
dents and accident repeaters that considers the vast majority of accidents
to be avoidable mistakes. These notions presume that all drivers are either
"good" or "bad" and they manifest a belief that for nearly all accidents,
one can find at least one "at fault" driver whose behavior was negligent
or culpable, and who was thereby instrumental in "causing" the accident.
Drivers who "cause" accidents are regarded as accident prone and are
thought to be a small, identifiable group that is guilty of hazardous driving.
*By accident repeater we mean any driver involved in more than one
accident during some specified period of time.
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vastly overrepresented in accident statistics, and responsible for the
"accident problem." Moreover, it is believed that good, safe drivers do
not have accidents--at least they are not "responsible" for any.
This popular concept of accident proneness profoundly influences
public and much expert opinion about problems concerning automobile
accidents, driver licensing and the compensation of accident victims. As
a result, careful consideration of the accuracy of this concept is important
in determining the appropriateness of the fault system, of various licensing
policies, and of automobile insurance rating schemes and cancellation
practice s.
In sincere efforts to address the root causes of accident losses, con-
cerned commentators turn to statistics indicating the fraction of drivers
involved in accidents, the accident rates of various groups of drivers, and
the like. Statistics such as "15% of all drivers cause 50% of the accidents "[8]
are often quoted to support the argument that the removal from the road of
a small fraction of all drivers would result in a substantial drop in the total
number of accidents.
However, one problem with making such inferences is the sensitivity
of the statistics to the time period of the data on which they are based.
After all, less than 1% of all drivers would account for all the accidents
recorded during any one week! The 15% figure should be compared not
with the 50% figure but with that fraction of all drivers that would be expected
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to account for half of all accidents if all drivers were equally likely to be
involved in accidents during the observed time period. Elsewhere, this
[1.., 12]author has examined such "15% cause 50%" figures in some detail.
Statistics developed from the normal two or three-year accident records
were found to be misleading in that they differed by less than 5% from the
percentages of drivers that would be expected for the equally likely case.
Further examination indicated that observed figures could be obtained even
if drivers with average accident rates of at least one reported accident every
two years accounted for less than one per cent of all reported accident in-
volvements.
The above results demonstrated that low values for the observed
percentages of drivers involved in accidents need not imply that the total
number of accidents could be significantly reduced by removing a small
fraction of the drivers from the road. However, they do not provide explicit
estimates of the number of accidents that might be avoided over a specified
period of time by a licensing "program" that ruled specific drivers off the
road. This paper examines the prospects for reducing the total number of
accidents in a more direct manner. In particular, California driver acci-
dent data are used to estimate the cumulative effect on the total number of
accidents reported each year of a program which removes drivers from the
road when they become involved in some minimum number of state-reportable
accidents.
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1. 2 Previous Work
Previous research efforts have produced estimates of the effect of
removing selected drivers from the road. In 1938 a study by Forbes[131
examined six-year data for 29, 000 Connecticut drivers. Forbes divided the
six years into two three-year periods and determined the number of acci-
dents during the second three years that involved drivers with one and two
accidents during the first three years. He found that drivers with at least
one accident during the first three years accounted for only 4% of the acci-
dents in the second period.
More recently, The Research and Statistics Section of the California
[6, 7]Department of Motor Vehicles has made similar estimates.[' Drivers
involved in at least two reported accidents during a two-year period accounted
for 1. 5% of the driving population and 3. 3% of all accidents in a subsequent
year.[6, p.2 ]Using two-year records of some 42, 000 males, the research
staff carried out a multiple linear regression of driver accident experience
during a third year on such factors as a driver's age, marital status, geo-
graphic areas and prior accident and traffic violation experience. [ The
results indicated a significant but low correlation (R = 0. 12). The drivers
predicted by the equations to have accident rates in excess of 0. 135 per
year made up 6. 4% (2, 658) of the driver population and accounted for 13%
(356) of the accidents reported during the next year.
The results of Forbes and the California group give some indication
of the apparently limited impact that would result from such driver removal
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programs. However, additional research is needed because of the following
drawbacks to the Forbes and California type of analyses:
(1) the data in the Forbes study included only a fraction of all the actual
accidents since reporting procedures at that time were much less extensive
than they are today;
(2) data covering long time periods are rare and regression equations
developed by the California Department of Motor Vehicles and by other re-
searchers are typically based on three (or fewer) years of accident records.
Such time periods are less than half the average time per driver between
accidents. As a result, accident experience is a poor criterion to use in
validating the regression equations and few drivers in the sample are involved
in more than one accident during the time period that is examined;
(3) predictions based on the regression analyses are somewhat biased
to the extent that the accident experience during the test year is used in de-
veloping the regression equations that predict the drivers with the highest
risk. Thus, the selected drivers are expected to be overrepresented in the
accidents recorded during the test year;
(4) neither the Forbes nor the California data were available in a form
that facilitated year by year examination of individual driver records. As a
result, the studies could not predict the cumulative effect over several years
of actually operating a driver removal program;
(5) finally, such studies do not adjust estimates of the number of
accidents avoided to account for effects due to multiple car accidents (75%
of all accidents involve two or more vehicles. [7]) The results are
developed from driver records that indicate involvement in
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accidents. A single multiple-car accident would appear on the records of
more than one driver. In such a case, it is not clear whether removing one
or more of the drivers from the road would have avoided the accident in
que stion.
The present research effort makes use of more recent data (1959-
1968). These data contain only state-reported accidents* but do not include most
accidents involving bodily injury. In addition, this report considers six
yearly time intervals instead of Forbes' two three-year periods and the re-
sults are adjusted to account for enforcement problems and the fact that
some accidents involve several drivers. The latter two considerations pro-
vide more realistic estimates of the effect of operating an actual license
revocation program than have been obtained previously.
1. 3 Driver Accident Data
Obtaining useful driver record data for a period of more than three
years is quite difficult. Most Motor Vehicle Departments have purged
records of information more than three years old, and insurance company
records are not kept in a manner suitable for tabulation of accident data for
a controlled sample of drivers. The author, through his association with
the U. S. Department of Transportation's Automobile Insurance and
Compensation Study, was priveleged to obtain a portion of some six-year
driver record data from Dr. Albert Burg of U. C.L. A. 's Institute for
Transportation and Traffic Engineering (ITTE). The data covered time
periods ranging from November, 1959 through February 1968 and was
*The National Safety Council estimates that one-quarter to one-third of all
accidents are reported to state authorities[17]
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obtained at a cost of several hundred thousand dollars through the coopera-
tion of ITTE, the California Department of Motor Vehicles (CDMV), the
drivers involved, and a number of insurance companies. The data collec-
tion process and several statistical analyses of the data are given in various
reports by Dr. Burg. [ 3 ' ] The data may be described briefly as follows:
(1) Drivers were sampled from queues in CDMV offices of individuals
renewing driver's licenses. A total of 29, 276 drivers were originally
processed.
(2) Accident, citation, biographic and physiological information of
various types was obtained for each driver from CDMV files, insurance
company records and an interview and testing session with each driver.
Data for drivers with fewer than three complete years on record were held
for approximately one year and then processed.
(3) All information for each driver was encoded onto a minimum of
six 80-column data cards and then stored on magnetic tape.
(4) After approximately three years had elapsed from the first
data search, the records of 8, 362 drivers were partially updated. For
7, 842 of these drivers complete records over the second-three year period
were available. Unfortunately no insurance company data was obtained for
the second three-year period.
Several characteristics of the data are worth noting here. The data
is unavoidably biased to the extent that motorists who are licensed and/or
drive in California during short time periods (less than six consecutive
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years) drop out of the six year sample. A driver whose license had been
suspended would still be included, but a driver whose license had been
revoked or who was killed in an accident would drop out. However, Burg
compared age, sex and other driver characteristics in his sample with
those of a 2% sample of all California licensed drivers and found no large
differences. Also, the degree of rarity of serious accidents--less than
1% of all reported accidents--indicates that any bias resulting from elim-
inating drivers involved in serious accidents from the population is small.
A second problem was that delays in processing the sampled drivers
and the "purge files after three years" restriction of the CDMV resulted in
some uncertainty and inaccuracy regarding the time-period associated with
each driver. The ITTE data specified the date on which each accident
occurred. However, the six-year period for each driver was not fixed but
centered around one of two possible interview dates. As a result, an ex-
tensive amount of data analysis was required to appropriately define the
number of accidents involving each driver during his six-year period. This
analysis was done on two IBM 360/65 systems located at the Federal High-
way Administration and at the M. I. T. Information Processing Center. The
results are discussed in Appendix B of another report by the author [ 1] and
indicated that uncertainties regarding the time-period had a negligible im-
pact on the accident count during each "year."
The final data list developed from the ITTE data for use in this re-
port was arranged in a simple form that is compact and yet permits one to
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extract from it any desired combination of driver accident statistics. The
data specifies the number of drivers out of the total driver population de-
scribed by each possible six-digit combination (x(l), x(2),... ,x( 6)), where
x(i) = the number of accident involvements during the i year, i = 1, 2, 3, 4,
5, 6. The 7, 842 drivers in the ITTE data sample resulted in 144 such com-
binations. The combinations are listed elsewhere.[ 1,App.
This format provided an efficient means of storing the data and
enabled one to rapidly extract data relating specific drivers to accidents in
any of, in this case, six separate time periods. The number of drivers in
the sample involved in a total of 0, 1, 2, ... state-reported accidents during
all six years is given in Table 1.
Number of
Accidents
0
1
2
3
4
5
5+
Table 1 - Six-Year ITTE Data
ITTE Data*
Number of Drivers Percentage
5,147 65. 63
1, 859 23. 71
595 7..59
167 2. 13
54 0.69
14 0. 18
5 0. 07
7, 842 100.00%
*The six year period ranged between November, 1959 and February, 1968.
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2. 1 Methodology
The procedure used to obtain unadjusted estimates of the accidents
avoided by removing drivers from the road may be described as follows:
(1) Consider a hypothetical program that would review the accident
records of all drivers at the end of each year and
(case 1) remove all drivers from the road who
have been involved in at least X acci-
dents (the cutoff number) since the
first year the licensing program was
begun, or
(case 2) remove all drivers from the road who
have been involved in at least X acci-
dents during that year (X = 1, 2, 3,...). *
(2) Determine the number of accidents in which each driver in the
ITTE sample was involved during each of the six years.**
(3) E stimate the effect that operation of the program would have
had on the 7, 842 sample drivers during the six years by
(a) Examining each driver's record to determine
in what year (if at all) he would have been re-
moved from the road.
*Note that case 2 removes fewer drivers than does case 1 for any particular
value of X.
**The 144 accident combinations described earlier provide this information.
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(b) Counting any accident appearing on a driver's
record during a year after he would have been
removed from the road as an accident that is
"avoided" during that year.
(4) Tabulate the total number of drivers that would have been
removed from the road by the start of each year, and the number of acci-
dents that would have been avoided during each year.
2. 2 Unadjusted Estimates
A short Fortran program was used to carry out the above procedure
for the 144 accident combinations that summarized the accident records of
the 7, 842 drivers in the ITTE sample. In presenting the estimates, several
measures were possible depending upon whether current year results or
running averages were considered. For example, the number of accidents
avoided after four years of operating the program might be expressed either
as the fraction of accidents that would have been avoided during the fourth
year out of those that occurred during that fourth year, or as the total frac-
tion of accidents that had been avoided out of all the accidents that occurred
during the first four years. The approach that appeared most realistic (and,
at the same time, indicated the largest possible fraction of accidents avoided)
was to use the fraction of all drivers removed from the road prior to the
start of each year and the fraction of accidents avoided out of those that
would have occurred during that particular year.
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Tables 2 and 3 present the results for cases 1 and 2, respectively,
and for various accident cutoffs. The estimates are expressed as percent-
ages--e. g., for case 1, 4% or 306 of the 7, 842 drivers were involved in at
least two accidents during the first three years. These 306 drivers accounted
for 8% or 56 of the 679 accidents reported to involve the 7, 842 drivers during
the fourth year. The results for each year, then, are an estimate of the
cumulative effect on that year's accidents of having operated the driver-
removal program for the given number of prior years. The net effect after
five years of operation is reflected in the "total" rows in each of the tables.
2. 3 Interpreting the Results
As was mentioned in Section 1. 2, several questions must be con-
sidered in determining whether the results of Tables 2 and 3 actually reflect
the total number of accidents that might be avoided if such a driver-removal
program were in fact implemented. In particular, one must consider
(1) whether the implementation of such a program would, by itself, deter
motorists who remain on the road from hazardous behavior, (2) whether
drivers "removed from the road" would, in fact, stop driving and (3) whether
a particular accident would have been avoided if one of the drivers involved
had been removed from the road during a previous year. (Recall that multiple
car accidents appear on more than one driver's record and, hence, the
question of which driver to remove in order to avoid the accident is subtle. )
First, let us consider whether implementing such a program would
produce a deterrent effect substantially greater than that of current licensing
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Table 2 - Effect of Removing Drivers From the Road
(Case 1)
Percentage of Drivers Removed by the Start of Each Year
(out of 7, 842 total)
Percentage removed if
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
Six-year Totals
X= 1
0. 00
7.35
13.61
19. 60
25. 18
30.44
30.44
X = 2
0. 00
0.43
1. 85
3. 90
6. 08
8.43
8.43
X = 3
0. 00
0. 01
0.29
0. 73
1. 36
2.22
2.22
X=4
0. 00
0. 00
0. 04
0. 11
0. 32
0. 61
0. 61
Percentage of Accidents Avoided During Each Year
Actual
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
Six-year Totals
Number of
Accidents
611
628
672
679
694
593
3, 877
Percentage avoided if
X = 1
0. 00
15.45
23. 07
30. 93
36. 89
45. 02
25.41
X= 2
0. 00
1. 91
4.17
8. 25
11. 10
16. 69
7.02
X= 3
0. 00
0. 00
0. 74
2.06
2. 74
6. 75
2.01
Note: Estimates were developed from the ITTE data. A driver was con-
sidered removed from the road at the end of the year in which his
total number of accident involvements up to and including that year
was at least X.
X= 4
0. 00
0. 00
0. 15
0. 44
1. 01
2. 36
0. 66
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Table 3 - Effect of Removing Drivers From the Road
(Case 2)
Percentage of Drivers Removed by the Start of Each Year
(out of 7, 842 total)
Percentage
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
Six-year Totals
X= 1
0. 00
7. 35
13.60
19.60
25. 18
30.44
30.44
X= 2
0. 00
0.43
1.02
1. 63
2.27
2.84
2.84
removed if
X= 3
0.00
0.01
0.06
0. 15
0. 15
0.22
0.22
Percentage of Accidents Avoided During Each Year
(out of 3,877 total)
Actual
Year
1
2
3
4
5
6
Six-year Totals
Number of
Accidents
611
628
672
679
694
593
3, 877
Percentage avoided if
X= 1
0. 00
15. 45
23. 07
30. 93
36. 89
45. 02
25.41
X= 2
0. 00
1. 91
2. 38
3.24
5.04
7.25
3. 30
X= 3
0. 00
0. 00
0. 30
0. 74
0.43
0.84
0. 39
Note: Estimates were developed from the ITTE data. A driver was con-
sidered removed from the road at the end of the year in which his
number of accident involvements during that year was at least X.
X=4
0. 00
0. 00
0.01
0. 01
0. 01
0. 01
0.01
X= 4
0. 00
0. 00
0. 15
0.44
0. 00
0. 34
0. 15
w
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programs. It is conceivable that accidents might be avoided not only as a
direct result of removing specific drivers from the road, but also by altering
the driving behavior and accident involvement rates of motorists who remain
licensed as a result of the threat of possible license revocation. However,
all state laws currently provide for license suspension and revocation in
selected cases and/or at the discretion of the motor vehicle authority. Hence,
observed accident rates should already reflect this deterrent effect.
One might argue that the effect of existing programs is minimized
since only a small portion of drivers actually have their licenses revoked.
However, Oregon studies investigating the effect of warning letters and other
threats to individual motorists report no significant improvement in the sub-
sequent accident rates of these drivers. [ 14 ] In addition, behavioral and
psychological considerations appear to discount the possibility of a significant
deterrent effect resulting from an extensive driver removal program.[16
Another indirect effect on the number of accidents might result if
removing drivers from the road affects environmental factors such as the
density of cars. However, traffic density and other environmental factors
would not be expected to change appreciably unless a substantial number of
drivers were ruled off the road--certainly a number too large to be politically
fea sible.
The second problem to be considered is that drivers whose licenses
are suspended or revoked often continue to drive. In fact, studies by the
California Department of Motor Vehicles indicate that as many as 68% of
16.
motorists whose licenses have been revoked continue to drive. [ 5 ] Unless
a driver-removal program were accompanied by rigid enforcement, the
estimated number of accidents avoided would have to be reduced by a frac-
tion of the order of one-half.
The third problem involves the fact that a single state-reportable
accident might appear on more than one driver's record if the accident in-
volved more than one vehicle. The California data include any reported
accident involvement in each motorist's record as long as the driver was
operating the vehicle at the time of the accident. In such a case it is not
clear that an accident would have been avoided by removing only one of the
drivers from the road.
The "driver fault" approach toward accident occurrence suggests
one method of adjusting the estimates of Section 2. 2 in a manner that
circumvents this multiple car accident complication. According to the
approach, one assumes that nearly all accidents involve one driver to
whom primary responsibility for the accident may be assigned. It is this
responsible driver who is "charged" with the accident and it would have
been necessary to remove him from the road in order to have avoided the
accident. By reviewing the circumstances surrounding each accident,
the "innocent" involvements could be erased from a driver's record so that
each accident would be recorded only on the record of the responsible driver.
Had this procedure been applied to the records of the 7, 842 drivers in the
ITTE sample, new estimates of the accidents saved by operating a
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driver removal program could be determined from the revised data using
the same method that produced the results in Tables 2 and 3.
The difficulty with this approach is that any number of factors may
have contributed to a particular accident and isolating a single factor as the
cause is difficult and not always meaningful.[1 5 16, 18 Nevertheless, the
"fault" approach is recommended by those who argue that a small group of
chronic accident repeaters cause most of the accidents and has
been used to criticize the methods of Forbes and others who suggest that
taking a few drivers off the road would not reduce the total number of acci-
dents substantially. For these reasons, the approach is used here in
adjusting the results of Section 2. 2.
Driver accident data for a large random sample of drivers over a
time period as long as six years and to which a consistent and unambiguous
definition of fault has been applied is not available. For the 3, 877 accidents
recorded on the records of the 7, 842 drivers in the ITTE sample, there is
no indication of fault. However, by considering various extreme cases re-
garding which accidents would or would not be avoided, estimates of the
range of possible effects of a driver-removal program, may be developed
from the results of Tables 2 and 3.
2.4 Adjusted Estimates
In adjusting the estimates of Tables 2 through 3 primary emphasis
is placed on accounting for the fact that a single accident may appear on
several drivers records. Based on  indirect marginal deterrent and,
several drivers records. Based on the indirect marginal deterrent and
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environmental effects are assumed to be negligible, and adjustments for the
fact that many restricted motorists continue to driver are considered
separately after estimating the maximum possible fraction of accidents that
might be avoided. The specific method for adjusting the estimated number
of accidents avoided to account for the effect of multiple car accidents is
detailed in the next several paragraphs.
First we note that few, if any, of the 3, 877 accidents in the ITTE
sample are likely to have involved more than one of the 7, 842 drivers. To
see this, assume that each accident involved two drivers: and that the
drivers were randomly sampled from the approximately 10 million California
motorists licensed during 1960 to 1968. The chance that any individual
accident involved a second driver in sample would then be 8, 000/10, 000, 000
and the number of accidents out of the total involving two drivers in the
sample would have a binomial distribution with probability P = 8, 000/10, 000, 000.
Consequently, the probability that more than ten accidents would involve more
than one driver in the ITTE sample is less than 0. 001.':* Thus, a negligible
number of individual accidents are expected to involve more than one ITTE
*The National Safety Council figures indicate that 75% of all crashes in-
volves at least two drivers and that multiple-car crashes involve an
average of 2. 05 drivers. [17 ]
*:*'The probability of 0. 001 is determined using a Poisson approximation to
the binomial distribution. [9]
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sample driver, but approximately 75% of them are expected to involve another
driver not in the sample.
The "driver fault" approach toward determining which driver must
be removed in order to have avoided an accident would be to assign primary
"responsibility" to one of the drivers involved in any particular accident.
An accident would be counted as an "avoided" accident if the responsible
driver had been removed in a previous year. The total number of accidents
out of the approximately 3, 870 in the ITTE sample for which the driver in
the sample was responsible would be approximately (3, 870 x 0. 25 + 1/2
(3, 870 x 0. 75) ), or about 2, 420. That is all the single car accidents (25%
of the total) and about half of the multiple car accidents would still be recorded.
If this "driver fault" approach had been applied to the ITTE accidents
before the estimates of Tables 2 and 3 had been calculated, the results might
have been different. For lack of information, we cannot be sure which of
the 3, 870 accidents constitute the 2, 420 that should be counted. Nevertheless,
changes in the predicted percentage of accidents avoided will be determined
primarily by the extent to which accident frequency and accident responsibility
are correlated. By considering extreme amounts of correlation, one can
estimate bounds on the magnitude of the changes.
If the number of accidents in which a driver is involved is uncorre-
lated with the fraction of his accidents in which he is "at fault," we would
expect the results of Tables 2 and 3 -to overstate the actual effect of a
driver-removal program on the number of accidents. The reason is that
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eliminating "innocent" accidents would reduce the total number of recorded
accidents and would also decrease the number of drivers meeting the criterion
each year. Since the assignment of fault and the number of accidents per
driver would be uncorrelated, the new ratio of the number of accidents
avoided to the total number of accidents recorded would be expected to be
the same as for the ITTE results. However, fewer drivers would be removed
each year. Removing fewer drivers, each with a similar proportion of
accidents to be avoided, would imply a lower total fraction of accidents
avoide d.
On the other hand, one might argue that the more accidents a driver
has had, the more likely it is that he was "responsible" for each of them.
Thus, drivers with 2, 3, or mnore accidents would be expected to be re-
sponsible for more than half of their accidents.
In the case where any driver involved in any accident is removed from
the road, it is unlikely that fault considerations would substantially alter the
results. Since all drivers involved in accidents are removed, the only bias
that might result from a correlation between fault and accident frequency
would be that drivers more likely to be at fault would tend to be involved in
accidents sooner. As a result, drivers who are involved in accidents during
the first few years would be expected to have a better than 50% chance of
being at fault in any future accidents. However, this increase in the number
of accidents avoided as a result of this bias is offset by the fact that fewer
drivers will be removed from the road if "innocent" accidents are not counted.
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Thus, adjustments for multiple car accidents using the "driver fault"
approach are not likely to change the estimated percentage of accidents
that are avoided when all drivers involved in accidents are removed from
the road.
In the cases where drivers involved in at least two accidents are
removed from the road, fault considerations may be significant. The
maximum possible fraction of accidents avoided would result if all drivers
involved in at least the cutoff number of state-reported accidents are
"responsible" for all their accidents. Such a situation is an extreme case,
particularly when the cutoff number of accidents is 2 or 3, since it excludes
the possibility of a driver being "innocently" involved in as many as the
cutoff number of accidents.
The estimated fraction of accidents avoided in this extreme case may
be determined as follows. Since any driver meeting the criterion is assumed
to be responsible for all past and future accidents, the ITTE figures for the
fraction of drivers removed and for the number of accidents avoided per
driver removed will apply. However, the total number of accidents will be
reduced--since "innocent" drivers are no longer counted--by a factor of
2, 420/3, 870 as explained at the start of this section. Estimates of the
maximum possible fraction of accidents saved in each year, then, are obtained
by multiplying the previously obtained percentages of accidents avoided
by 3, 870/2, 420 to account for the reduced number of accidents.
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In making the above adjustments, we assume that all drivers
"removed" from the road do, in fact, stop driving. Presently, licensing
authorities "remove" drivers from the road by revoking their license (jail
sentences and other alternatives are unwarranted treatment for any
significant fraction of drivers). The California study cited above in
Section 2. 3 indicated that many motorists drove despite a revoked license.
Unless imposed enforcement accompanied a driver removed program, this
estimated maximum number of accidents avoided would have to be reduced
by a factor of approximately two.
The approximations discussed above were incorporated into adjusted
estimates of the percentages of accidents avoided and drivers removed.
Figure 1 illustrates the adjustments made for fault, and enforcements con-
siderations for each of the percentages. To aid the reader in comparing the
various adjusted and unadjusted results, several graphs are also provided.
The adjusted and unadjusted estimates are presented in Figures 2 and 3.
Figure 2 considers the case where a driver is removed from the road when
involved in a total of X accidents. Figure 3 considers the case where in-
volvement in X accidents in one year is the criterion. The graphs indicate
the percentage of drivers trained by the start of each year and the percentage
of accidents avoided during each year as a result of the program's operation
up to that time.
The lines connecting the small circles indicate the unadjusted esti-
mates. The curves indicating the maximum possible percentage of accidents
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avoided reflect the adjustments for multiple car accidents described earlier.
The minimum percentage is liberally estimated as half the maximum to
account for enforcement problems (half the unadjusted estimates would be
a more conservative estimate).
For the case where any driver involved in accidents is removed from
the road, so many drivers would have to be removed that implementation of
the program could hardly be considered feasible. The curves do, nonethe-
less, indicate what fraction of accidents in any particular year involved
drivers with accidents during the previous 1, 2, 3, 4, or 5 years. Shading
the range of possible values for each curve in this case would have resulted
in overlapping areas and was not done.
For those cases where accident repeaters are removed from the
road (i. e., X = 2, 3, .. .), a lot fewer drivers are affected. However, only
for case 1 and the X = 2 criterion is it conveivable that more than 15% of
any one year's accidents could be avoided--and even then only after five
years of operating the program. For this case, drivers are ruled off the
road after their second accident involvement since the program's inception
(year "1"). By the start of the fifth year, some 6% of the drivers would
have been removed from the road and a maximum of 18% of that years acci-
dent might be avoided as a result. Expressed another way, at least four
drivers would have to be removed for each accident avoided during the fifth
year. If randomly selected drivers were ruled off the road approximately
eighteen would have to be removed from each accident avoided (based on the
adjusted number of accidents. )
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The results look promising although perhaps not spectacular. Never-
theless, it must be remembered how these upper bounds were obtained.
We assumed that everyone involved in two or more accidents was "responsible"
for each of them and that no one was innocently involved in more than one
accident during the five years. In addition, the driver removal programs
are assumed to be completely effective in that the selected drivers are
assumed to stop driving indefinitely.
For higher cutoffs (X = 3, 4,...) the "responsibility" assumptions
used to obtain the upper bounds are more realistic. However, so few drivers
meet the criteria that the percentage of accidents avoided remains small.
The next section summarizes the analysis of sections 2. 1 through 2.4 and
presents several conclusions.
3. 1 Summary and Conclusions
Taking the "nut behind the wheel" off the road has been a frequently
recommended solution to the "accident problem." Its advocates argue that
a small group of chronic accident repeaters account for most of the accidents
and that the total number of accidents would drop substantially if these
motorists were not permitted to drive.
Studies such as those by Forbes and the California Department of
Motor Vehicles [ 7, 13] indicated only a small correlation between accident
records of drivers during separate time periods. These results suggested
that programs which remove accident repeaters from the road would not
eliminate a major proportion of all accidents. However, such studies have
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been critized as based on incomplete data over short time periods with no
adjustments for fault considerations and multiple car accidents. In addition,
it is difficult to translate the results of the studies into explicit estimates
of the cumulative effect over several years of operating a specific strategy
for revoking the license of selected drivers.
In this paper, recent six-year California driver accident data were
used to estimate the cumulative effect on the total number of accidents
reported each year of a program which removed drivers from the road when
they became involved in some minimum number of state-reported accidents.
The hypothetical program was assumed to review each driver's accident
record at the end of each year and revoke the license of (or other wise rule
off the road) any driver involved in at least X accidents since the program' s
inception (case 1) or during the current year (case 2) for X = 1, 2, 3...
From the six-year data the number of drivers who would have met the
revocation criterion at the end of each year was determined. Unadjusted
estimates of the program's effect on the number of accidents in subsequent
years were then obtained by counting the number of accidents during years
two through six that involved drivers whose licenses would have been revoked
by the "program" during a previous year.
These raw estimates (Tables 2 and 3) are based on more recent,
comprehensive data than that of Forbes and on longer time periods than the
California Department of Motor Vehicle studies. In addition the results
provide explicit estimates of the percentage of accidents avoided during any
29.
particular year as a result of operating specific license revocation strategic
during the previous one through five years.
The difficulty with the raw estimates is that they are developed from
individual driver records which, like the Forbes and California data, count
accident involvements and (without cross reference) list a multiple car
accident on the record of each involved driver. Since the data does not
provide information about each recorded incident, it is not clear whether
one or perhaps more accident involvements might have been avoided by
removing one of the involved drivers from the road.
Skeptics argue that one needs data that records an accident only on
the record of one responsible driver. Including "innocent" involvements,
they say, hides the small group of drivers who cause most of the accidents
and results in low estimates of the accidents avoided by operating a stringent,
enforced license revocation program. No such data is available for large
sample sizes. However, sections 2. 3 and 2.4 of the paper developed a
method for adjusting the estimates of Tables 2 and 3 to determine the
maximum possible effect that such fault considerations might make. The
adjusted estimates were presented in Figures 2 and 3. The results in-
dicated that to avoid a truly large fraction of all reported accidents--say
50%- -an enormous number of drivers would have to be ruled off the road--
at least one out of every three drivers.
License revocation strategies with current enforcement practices
could reduce the accident count by as much as 10% only if the licenses of
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7% of the drivers were revoked. Liberal adjustments for fault considera-
tions and an assumption that all selected motorists would actually stop
S&m
driving, could conceivably result in a 20% savings in accidents from the 7%.
However, obtaining such an effect would require that a driver be ruled off
the road when deemed responsible for his second accident and would take
five years to be realized. If the small percentage of drivers most frequently
involved in accidents were removed from the road, a large reduction in the
total number of accidents would not result. Even when the most liberal
adjustments for "driver fault" and multiple-car-accident considerations
were made, the percentage of accidents avoided by removing the 2% or 3%
of the drivers most frequently involved in accidents remained less than 10%.
The analysis presented here addresses the major criticisms of the
work of Forbes, the California Department of Motor Vehicles and others
who estimate the impact of accident repeaters on the total number of accidents.
Specific estimates are provided for the effect of removing accident-involved
drivers from the road. The results corroborate the conclusion of Forbes
and the California group that the "normal" automobile driver accounts for
most accidents and not a small group of chronic accident repeaters.
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